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THE RI GUT TO PRI VACY.
This is a subject that has just begun to assume
importance and attract attention. It has been little
discussed and that very recently. In Vol. IV., No. 5,
of the Harvard Law Review for December, 1890, this right
was very ably supported by Samuel D. Warrier and Louis D.
Braridies. And it was also touched upon in the July
number of Scribners Nagazine for 1890, by E. L. Godkin
at pages 65-67. From both of these articles I have
received very material assistance, especially from the
article in the Harvard Law Review. There is one adjudi-
cated case bearing directly ori this right, Schuyler v
Curtis, 15 N. Y. Supp. 787, of which more anon.
Although this right has never been recognized
judicially until recently, that is as the right
to privacy, it may be said to have been admitted
irider fictions arid ivn connection with uther subjects.
The nature of this right is so tue piysical, arid,
is it affects simply the ease and comfort of the indi-
viduai, his happinessarid peace of mind, arid his s-nse of
security, a great deal of diffic"lty is to be expeoted
C
in getting the courts to recognize it in its entirety at
once. They must adopt it piece by piece, particle by
particle, halting at times, but 1 think, finally, recog-
nizing it fully. The same difficulties are to be met
with in this case as irn the treatment of any new subject
Judges are very reluctant to depart from their accustom-
ed routine and deal vith new subjects, requiring differ-
ent principles and rules to govern them.
The right to privacy, as it is to be treated in
this discussion, means: the right that a person has to
keep to himself his affairs and relationsthat are of a
purely private natureand do not affect materially his
relations with persons with whom he is to deal; or in
case he is a public officer, or a candidate for such
officedo not tend to irmftr the people of his capacity
arid ability to discharge the duties that are, or may be,
imposed upon him. It is the right as Judge eooLey says
in his work on Torts, 2nd. ed.p 29, "to be let alone".
'That can be of more valu,. to a man than a sense of secu-
rity in his person, property and private affairs?
No mar can do as well, feel as well, or be of much valu.
to the community, when he is unhappy. Can a man be happy
and contenited with life, when he knows that his domestic
relations, his private dealings, and his general life,
no matter how good and virtuous these may be,are laid
bare to the scrutiny and criticism of the public? There
are a few, who are so desirious of publicity, that they
will even go so far as to commit a crime in order that
they may secure notoriety; that they may have their
names and accomplishments, on the lips and irn the minds
of men. But this class of people is comparatively small
and of little importance. The great majority of men
desire quietude, peace and comfort, and fr-:edo!. from
criticism. July No. Scribners Magazine. ("The Rights of
the Citizen ", by E. L. Godkin, pp. 65-67)
The scrutinizing eye and bare faced effrontery of
the press, in seeking every opportunity of giving some
news, or revealing something that may gratify some morbid
taste; new inventions una mechanical devices, particularly
I
that of the camera, have long made it apparent that
there ought to be some restraint in their exercise.
Not only does it give pain to the individual to
have his private affairs and his domestic relations
made public; but it lowers the morality of the people
at large. Every fresh bit of gossip and scandal
pleases the taste of some, and by a continuous display
to the public view secures new followers. So that minds
that are capable of other and better things are diverted
from their usual course, arid follow this spicy and scan-
dalous rievs, much to their detriment. The nature of the
news, appealing as it does to the weak side of human
nature, makes it more interesting arid, therefore, more
detrimental to the public norality.
The value of this righttr the colmrunit arid to the
individual being shown, the question then is, Does the
law recognize it? Will it protect it? As there is no
statute on this subject, we must search the common law.
In searching this we find no decision directly in point,
but the elasticityand continuous g:'owth of the common
law to cover new subjects; to deai with new inventions;
to adapt itself to the varying and ever advancing
civilization; gives us hopes that it wililextend its
protecting folds and cover this right.
The common law is nothing more or let, thau the
policy of the people, as strengthened arid adapted to
practical use 'y usage, which is the evidence and proof
of its general fitness and common convenience. (Nor ay
Plane Co. V Boston & the R. R. Co., I Gray 267.) Were
this not so, any new invention, any new business, as rail
roads, telegraphs and the like, would be practically
without any law to govern them, untii some statutory pro
vision had been made. It would be ve -y difficult,
almost impossible,to construct a statute that would
govern the new invention or business in all its detailsi
while the common law composed of a very few general prin
ciples, that are elastic and capable of adaptingt them-
selces to any state of affairs that fi-ll within its
domain, will be applicable.
From these general rules the tribunal forris partic-
ular rules that will apply more specifically to the sub-
ject in hand; so that, finally, the new subject will
have a law of its own governed by rules that belong to
it alone.
What was policy to the people centuries ago, 4k
in the then crude times, cannot be said to be policy now
The people ot a necessity have adopted a new policy.They
live and conduct their affairs in a different manner.
They have apopted new rules. To go back and govern our-
selves by, the common law of that time, would be an
absurdity. I do not claim that all the rules of the ear
ly common law should be abolished;;on the other hand,
many of them will apply to day, but only those that are
adapted to our changed position and circumstances.
Controversies, as to this right, did not arise at
early common law because it was not violated to any ex-
tent. It was not violated because there were no such
oppotunities as we have to-day. The newspapers were
of little importance; the crown restricted their publi-
cation and circulation; the art of photography was un-
known. As the wrong in the violauion of this right
consists of the injury to the feelings of the party,
if he never hears of the violation of this right, he is
not injured. There w-s of course some gossip and dis-
cussion of the private affairs of people in the early
times, but the pevson gossiped about seldom knew of the
gossip an4consequently was not injured. As long as the
t
gossip coritinuea to be by w,.rd of mouth, it was rarely
brought to the persons knowledge. (Scribners Miagazine,
July No. 1890, p 66.) So at early common law this right
was not violated to any great extent. 2ut now that the
newspapers devote many colums to such gossip, the person
sees it and is unde: the impression that everyone he
meets knows of his various little indiscretions and his
private affairs. (Scribners Magazine, July No. 1890. p 66 )
Even if the attempt to protect this right had been
made, the courts would have failed to grant relief;
because in early times the common law judges became the
slaves of precedent. They came to be so r-igid in their
dealings with cases, that they would not recognize any
new principles. In fact the common law, instead of be-
ing unwritten came virtually to be written. The judges
were as unable to depart from their old rutsand take
cognizance of new principles, as if the common law had
been reduced to a statute. (See Pomeroys Eq. Juris.
Vol. I, -# 16.)
This state of affairs could not exist for any great
length of time, so the court of equity was institu~edhavir,
as its foundation justice and reason. The court of
equity continued as a seperate tribunal for some time.
The commorn law judges)gradually givinEg up their tech-
riicalities, beean to take cognizance of the right and
wrong in a case5 (Por. Eq. Juris. Vol.l., Al1?.)until,
finally, th- court of equity as a seperate tribunal,
has ceased to exist in England anid iri most of the States
of this country. During this condition of the early
courts it would have been very difficult to have the
courts recognize this principle, doubly so because of
its metaphysical character;but rnow the courts recognize
the fact that only a part of maris enjoyment of life lies
in material things.
Considering the state of affairs in early times,
we find that there was no practical violation of the
right to privacy; and therefore, no need of the estab-
lishment of a rule of law that would give relief in case
of its infringement. Then,in early timesthere were no
rules of law applying to railroads and telegraphs,
because there were no such existing occupations. But
the readiriess, with which the common law was brought to
bear on these occupations; and from its broad pfrnciples
a law/applicable to these nem industries was gradually
developed, leads us to reason that now that the right
to privacy is violated, and finding so many reasons
for its protection, the common law will securely pro-
tect it.
I think the foregoing Oescription of theelasticity
and mobility of the common law would be sufficient to .
establish this right, but thence is another and fully s
strong an argument in its favor.
Although there is only one decission, that holds in
terms that a pe-sort has this right to privacy, this
right is virtually recognized by giving' injured party
protection; but basing the re.soning on some fiction
that has little to do with the justice of the case.
One instance of the protection of this right is
by permitting the writer of letters to enjoin their pub-
lication. A great deal of difficulty was experiencea
in getting the courts to recognize this right. They
saw that it wmas no more than proper that a person should
be pe-mitted to enjoin the publication of his letters;
but did not find at once upon what ground to grant the
desired protection. Finally it was held to be a breech
of trustor confidence, that the writer reposed in the re-
ceiver.(Abernathy v. Hutchinuon, 3 L. J. Ch., 229) It
was very difficult to see how the causs-J recipient of a
letter accepted any trust. (-larvard Law Review, Vol. No.5,
p 201.)
This doctrine of the trust would not protect the
writer as regards third personswho should get conTrol
over the letter; so, finally, the courts adopted the fict-
ion that the writer had property right in the letters.
Some courts distinguished between literary letters, those
whichthe writter intended to publish for profit, anld
ordinary business or friendly letters; and one court re-
fised to enjoin the public;tion of mere friendly letters,
because they were not of a literary character. ( Hoyt v.
Mackenzie, 2 Barb. Ch.' 220.) hut at last Judge Story,
in Folsom v. liarsh,(2 Story; Myres Federal Decisions.)
said " that he was not prepared to admit of the soundness
or propriety of the supposed distinction between letters
of business( or of a mere private or domestic character,
and letters which from thdir contents and character, are
treated as literary compositions. IDi the first case I
hold that the author of any letter and his representa-
tives, whether they are literary compositions, or familiar
letters of business, possesses the sole cnd exclusive
copyright; and that no person, neither thosE to whom they
are written, nor other persons have any right or authori-
ty to publish them.upoir their cwi acccunt or for their
own benefit. The generl property and the general rights
incident to yroperty, belong to the writer whether the
letters are literary coirnpositions,or familiar letters or
details of f:-cts or letters of business." It is very dif-
ficult to see what property a person can h-ve in a few
causal remarks, remarks that are reduced to writing,
remarks that he never intended to make any money by. It
is not the writing that is the subject of protection, but
the expressed thoughts; so it ought to -:ake no difference
whether the words are spoken or written, whether an act
or deed; ( Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV., No. 5, p.206.)
and it makes no difference whether they are of any pecu-
niary value or not, If aperson has a right to keep
his expressions to himself, he ought to be allowed to
keep his acts and deeds secret. I think it may be said,
that in these cases, it is simply th- right to privacy that
is recognized. If the courts must base their decisions
on the right to property, they 02! extend it to cover all
a persons private dealings under the definition of property
given in Andersons TLav Dictionary: propeo+.j .is there
defined as "that which is ones own, something which belongs
or inhers exclusi- ely to an individual person. In an
abstract sense, ownership, title, estate, Pnd riiht."
Property as thus defined , will includeevery right that
man has, but by the courts and by the common acceptation,
the term property is used in a reatricted sense. The
term property is used as applied to something, that a per-
son can exchange and get value for; something that the
people as a moral and intellectual class desire; something
that has a value pecuniarily, as recognized by good socie-
ty, guided by a fair standard of morality. Why not confine
the term property to its generally accepted sense and
thus do away with this technicality and fiction?
Another instance where the right has been recognized,
but under a fiction, is in the case of photokrapgy, Where
a photographer has, at the request of a customer, taken
a negative of the customer aid then developed pictures
for his own benefit,; the courts have implied a term into
the contract, namely, that the photographer shall make
only so many pictures as the customer shall order.(Pollard
v. Photographic Union, 40Ch. D. 345.) In the case where the
person enters into a cortrac~with the r-hotographer and
consciously sits while the photographer takes a negative,
this implied term will give the person the desired pro-
t ection. But how is a condition to be implied-when the
picture is taken surreptitiouslywhich prc.cess is rendered
very easy by modern appliances. Does not the person
wronged merit protection just as much in the one case as
in the other? But if the precedent that is established,
is followed closely, the injured party will have no remedy
in the latter case. This, of course, is obviously unjust.
The practical way of giving the injured person the desired
protection, is to say that the policy of the people has
changed; that the creation of new machinery and new invent-
ions, demands a broader and a different policy; and in
this particular case, that the facility of taking pictures
surreptitiously, demands the recognition of the right
under its proper head,-the riht t.Lo privcy.
These two insta'nces heretofore stated are the most
prominent and best illustrate the readiness of the courts
to protect this right and their position in basing their
recognition(on some fiction. There are more cases in
which this right has been protectedby means of fictions;
but it is ur'necessary to state them. One court, at least
has come out boldly ani reco :riized this righ; and calleai
it the right to privacy. It was a Supreme Court of the
State of New York- the State that has been foremost in
perceiving injustice, and grantin rIief - The case is
Schuyler v. Curtis , ( 15 N. Y. Supp. , 787.) in this case
a certain organization of women haodetermined that some
of the most prominent women in the United States should be
called attention to in the women's department of the
Worlds Fair; so they procured funds sufficient to efrect
statues of some of the leading women. They finally deter-
mined to hava statues made of Susan B. Anthony, entitled
"the modern women reformer", and another of Mrs. Schuyler,
entitling it "the woman philanthropist". Mrs. Schuyler,
during her life, had been very benevolent and had given
mut~h to alleviate the sufferings of the lower classes. She
was of a retiring disposition, disliking prominence of any
kind. Her nephew, the plaintiff in this sui6, b-o,ght Fhe
acuion in the inei'ests of the relatives of Mrs. Schuyler,
fo_ an injuncion i'tsraining The building and exhibitlon
of ,he statue of Mrs. Schuyler. The injunction was grant.-
ed on the ground that the relatives of Mrs. Schuyler had
a vxghi to she pzLivacy of her name and acts. The court
in its decision states explicitly that this would violate
the right to privacy, and in answer to the argument that
it was against public policy,!aid, ir, substance, that they
could nct see how it violated public policy, that there was
no reascn why people should know that Mrs. Schuyler was
a philanthropist; that the erection of her statue and its
public exhibition, would bring her name arid deeds into a
prominence, which both she and her suvivors disliked. The
fact that it might be beneficial to her does not have any-
thing to fo with the case. Persons possess this right and
have the sole option to say whether they shall surrender
it or not. Judge Brown cites the article in the
Harvard Law Review with approbation, saying that everyone
ought to read it •
In early Limes, in many cases, the only way the
courts could take cognizance of a new subject and grant
relief was by means of a fiction; so that, in those times
the fictions were of great valueto the people and in the
devolopment of the law. But now, with the creation of new
devises everyday, that are liable to interfere unduly with
the rights of some, it would be almost impossible to man-
ufacture the fictions necessary to give relief. The ten-
dency of the courts now is to transact their business on a
practical basis, trying to secure justice by a short
route and in the quickest possible manner. In other ,ords
the whole tendency of the courts is toward the so called
"law reform". BeAring this in mind, it gives us confi-
dence that the courts will protect this right properly.
I insert here Sir Henry Maines ideas of fictions.
(Sir Henry Maine Ancient Law, p 26.)
He defines a"Legal Fiction"to signify any assumption which
conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of
law has undergone alteration, its lette- remaining unchang
ed, its operation being modified. " It is not difficult
to understand why fictions in all their forms are particu
larly congenial to the infancy of society. ahey satis fy
the desire for improvement, which is not quite wanting,
at the same time they do riot offend the superstitious
dislike for change which is always present. At a partic
ular stage of social progress they are invaluable expe-
dients for overcomirg the rigidity of the law • We must,
therefore, not suffer ourselves to be affected by the
ridicule which Bentham pours on legal fictions whereever
he meets them. To revile them as merely fraudulent is to
betray ignorance of their peculiar office in the historic
al development of the law. But at the same time it wo ld
be equally foolish to agree with those theorists, who,
discovering that fictions huve had their uses, argue that
they ought to be stereotyped in our system. They have haa
their day, but it has long since gone by. It is unworthy
of us to effect art admittedly beneficial object by so rude
a devicelas a legal fiction. I cannot admit any anomaly
to be innocent, which makes the law either more difficult
to understand or harder to arrange in harmonious order.
V7ow legal fictions are the greatest obstacles to symmetric
al classification. Therule of law remains sticking in the
systeri, but it is a mere shell, and a new rule hides itself
under its cover. Hence there is at once a difficulty
in knowing whether the rule which is actually operative
should be classed in its true or in its appacen. p±Lce,
and minds of different casts will diff't' as to the branch
of the authorities which ought to be selected. If the Eng-
lish law is ever to assume an orderly distribution, it
will be necessary to prune away the legal fictions which
in spite of some recent legislutive inprovement,, are still
zxx xk kx abundant in it." Of course there are many cases
in which a person may not assert this right, because,
there are others whose interests are effected. Salus
populi supremnblex is the maxim that will apply. The most
notable exception is that of a public officer, or a candi-
date for such office. Any person who holds or propose.s to
hold a public office, parts with many of his private rights
He becomes prominent; he is discussed; his acts are
scrutinized and criticized. It is right and proper that
the people should know what sort of men are taking part
in their government, and how they are discharging their
The officers themselves are benefited.
duties.^ By the discussion and criticism, they learn the
will of the people and can proceed accordingly. The argu-
merit of public policy would apply here in its strongest
sense.
There are also many cases in which a private person
may riot assert this right. These are generally where the
person occupies a sort of quasi public position, depend-
ing on the patronage and custom of the people at large, as
hotel-keepers, merchants, railroad officials, teachers,
lawyers, clergymen and the like. In all these cases the
connec ted
persons are more intieiately with the people at large than
others ; and, to that extent, that which wouid be consid-
ered private in other cases, is surrendered for th e ben-
efit of the public. But in both the case of a public
officer and these other named persons, there is, of course
some limitation upon the intrusion into all their rela-
tions and dealings. in the case of a public officer or
a candidate for office, the people would have a right to
know of his general appearance, his ability as a speaker,
his former occupation, and the way in which he couducted
his business and the probabilities of his successfully
performing the duties of the public office. They would
not have a right to know every time he bought his wife a
presentto know the kind and value of it, and any special
exhibition of affecti,.n.
This right of the people to know everything about
the person who holds a public office , or is about to
assume the duties of one, is one that has every argument
in its favor. It is especially so in a republican form of
government, where the officers are chosen from and by the
people; chosen generally on account of their peculiar
ability to perform satisfactorilly, all the duties that may
devolve upon themin the discharge of their trust. in order
that the people ,nay be able to select those that will be
best able to participate in the management of public af-
fairs, there must be discussion; and, as many of the
people have never seen the officer or candidate, his
photograph may be taken and be circulated. His private
business relations may be described , so that the people
may acquire the requisite information necessary for them
to make a wise selection of candidates, and, likewise to
determine the advisability of keeping the present incum-
bent in office.
In the case of othei' persons, riot properly entitled
to claim the full protection of this right, as hotel-keep-
ers, for example, the public h,:s a right to know the size
of their hotels, the number and arrangement of the rooms
the general facilities for the accommodationand comfort
of guests, and the manner of conducting the business. Arid
so with a merchantbut itwould not be said that the land-
lord's or merchant's private roomkor house could be thus
described, that is, the shape and size of the rooms and
the like.
And in the case of an actor, the public have a right
to know and discusq within proper liwits; his ating and
general appearance;the quality of his voice and his genier-
al demeanor. Clergyman, lawyers, public lectures, and the
like, also loose some of the rights that they would ordi-
narily possess. It may be said that they are interesting
speakers,the quality of their voices, their fluency etc may
be commented upon.
The general rule that may be formulated from these
various cases is: When a person depends on the patronage
of the public at large, and holds himself out as ready to
respond to any call that may be made upon him in his line
of business, the public has a right to know any fact or
th a t
quality directly affects his ability to discharge the du-
ties that will devolve upon him in his general line of
business. Of course all a persons acts and relations will
which
to some extent, affect the readiness with/a person will
select him to take charge of his own matters; but it is
qui~e obvious that the line must be drawn somewhere, so 1
have said, "any matter that directly affects his ability
etcW I do not want to draw a rigid ling,.but simply one
that is adOpted to common sense. Every case willbe gove n
ed by its own peculiar features, but adoted from the gen-
eral rule as far as possible.
Another exception is the necessar, disclosures of
private matters in courts of justice, to the legislature,
and to quasi public corporations. This exception, as are
all the others, is due to the fact that the rights of
other people are affecteu; rights that are of more import-
ance than the right to privacy. But in all the'e ca es,
the right must receivecarelful attention, and be violated
only so far as necessary, and whe i the only practically cor
venient way of accomplishing the desired object.
This right to privacy must be distinguished from
slander and libel ; although in their means of vi(,lation
and nature of its accomplishment, they very closely resem-
with
ble this right, and might unthikingly be confounded it.
But the great distinguishing feature is that in slander
or libel some direct pecuniary interest is affected. In
order that an action for slander or libel may be main-
taine4 the person bringing the action must have sustain-
ed some pecuniary loss. But as in other injuries where
the injury has been maliciously donei the mental suffering
endured by the plaintiff, may be taken into consideration
as an element"punitivedamages. In order to start the
machinery of the courts the injury, in some way, must have
injured his reputation; so as to prevent or restrict his
dealings with his fellow citizens, and causing them to
shun his society.
Having considered the nature of this right, and
the probability of its just enforcement and protection by
the courts, our next thought wili be, what are the remedies
In this, as in other cases of tort, there are two remedies;
the injunction,and the action for damges.
The injunction, where it may be had, will be most
salutoryand will afford the most adequate r.iie;* and the
courts will not have so much abjection to it as they will
to the action for damages. In the case of an irnjurnction,
the injured party can have full and complete reiieP and
accomplish his object, that is preventing the disclosure of
that which is private. The relief by injunction has been
recognized in NewYork. ( Schuyler v. Curtis, ante)
But wherethe injury has been done, the right violat-
ed, it is ciear tat the person injured ought to have some
remedy. The only one is the action for damages. And here
is where we have our difficulty, The action for damages,
in this case will be for injury to the feelings, pure and
simple.
The courts of the different States are in great
confusion, as to when damages for mental suffering may be
allowed. Owing to the confusion of the courts, and to the
importance of the law of damages in connection with this
subject, I have determined to treat this branch of the law
somewhat at length.
Some of the courts hold that in order to recover
damages for mental suffering, the injury to the feelings
must have been incident to an injury to the person or prop-
erty and caused by the malice of the defendant, regarding
it as punitive damages. ( Green,*. Evid., Vol. 11., # 267,
note; Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227; Illinois R. R. Co. v.
Sutton, 53 Ill., 227; Wilson V. Young, 31 Wise., 582.)
Other courts hold, that where there is physical
injuryand the mental suffering is connected with the phys-
ical injury, a recovery may be had for the mental suffering
but not alone for mental suffering-. ( Canrnings V.
Willingstown, I Cush. 452; Ranson v. N. Y. ! Erie P. R.
Co., 15 N. Y. 4!5; Oniel v. Dry Dock Co., 15 N. Y. Supp.
841; Terra Uaute R. R Co, v Brinker, (1ndl 2C N.E. 176;
Fenny v. L. I. R. R. Cc., 116 N. Y. 375; Johnson v.Wellr
Vargo Co., (Nev.) 6 Am. Rep. 245.) In addition to the
authorities enumerated above Woods Mayne on Damages, at pag
page 74 says:- "So far as I have been able to ascertain
the force of the rule, the mental suffering referred to is
that which grows out of the sense of peril or the mental
agony at the time of the happening of the accident, and
that which is incident and blended with the bodily pain
incident to the injury, and anxiety thereby induced, but in
no case has it ever been held that mental ang:ish alone
unaccompanied by an injury to the purson might be compen-
sated fo-. ( See Cooley on Torts, page 271,to the same
effect) Thus the r1-le seemed to be well settled that in
order to recover for mental suffe'ring, there must have
been some other actual damage.
This lack of a recovery for mental suffering mas
due to the attidude of the Old common law judges. The
common law judges have ever since the earliest times had a
peculiar fear and dislike to deal with and to estimate the
happiness of man, to take into corisiderat..on his purely
mental operations. This has evinced itself most strongly
in the law of damages; but it has also come up in other con
nections, in contracts , gifts and the like. In the case
o f a gift for example, no matter how much love, affect-
ion or gratitude one may have for another, no matter how
intimately he may be interested in anothers welfare,
unless certain requisite formalities are gone through with
that is, delivery and acceptance, no valid gift can be made
The promise to give is unenforceable; but if the other
person gives something tangible, n matter how insignif-
igant, if there is no undue influerce, the gift will be
upheld.The position of the courts was due largely, at
first, to their inability to estimate the happiness of man
to have any standard by which they might be guided. This
once established by a case, was followed with slavish per-
sistence. It was greatly modified by introducing fictions,
so that the court, might say that they vere not awarding
damages for mental suffering, although in reality they N,,ere
as in the action for seduction, the fiction, 'per quod
servitum amissit' is resorted to and damages awarded on
that basis, but in reality wholly for the injury to the
feelings, pride, etc of the parent. This rule continued
down to a short time al-o with various rnodificationsby thc
use of fictions, but the courts alw.ays required pecuniu.,y
damage of some kirdeven if fictiticus.
By the introduction ol the te.iegraph a new way
of injuring the feelings resulted. The injury to the
feeling-s in this case is caused by the negligence of the
teleghaph company in delaying the transmission and deliv-
ery of a message announcing the illne- s or death of a rel-
ativeor near friens, thus prevenrtinr the receiver of the
message from Ueing present during the last moments or
attending the funeral of a friend or relative. All the
courts do not allow a r~-covecy of damages for mental suf-
ferint-, when caused by the negligence of the 6ellegraph
company in transmitting the message. Those courts which
have recognized the right to recover for mental angaish
thus caused have made a new rule, or a sort of new fiction,
that is, where th,2re is wrong done, a legal right viola-
tod, then nominal damages may be allowed; and where nom-
inal damages may be awarded, danages for injury to the -,
feeling may be granted. The fiction is that aithough they
have changed the rule and allow damages for mental suffer-
ing unconnected with an injury to the personi they profess
to keep within the rule and claim to have made no depart-
ure. They allow damages for mental suffering that has no
connection with an injury to the person, and this was
never done before. They resort to this fiction while at
the same time they complain of the old fictions of le corn-
:ron law. The courts are conservative, never departing any
more than is necessary from the existing rules to accom-
plish the desired object in a case. Nearly all the State
courts, where this question has arisen, have followed the
principles before stated. They are the Followirg;- (Chapman v
Tel. Co., (Ky.) 13 S. 1Y. 880; ;a,!oi. rth v. Tel. Co.,
86 Tenn.,395; Young v. Tel. Co. (N. C.) .2 Am. St. Rep.,
683; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Anderson, (Ala. ) ldAm. "t.
Rep. ; Western Union Tel. Co. v- Broesche, 72 Tex. 68V;
Reese v. Tel. Po., (Ind. ) 24 N. E. 153. ) The last named
case did riot adopt this fictioq but granted relief on the
broad ground of justice and reason. In this case Judge
Terkshire said:- "Some of the authorities seek to draw a
distinction as to the right to recove' damages for mental
suffering, between cases where there may be a recovery
for pecuniary loss and cases where there is or can be no
pecuniary loss, to which case the present one belongs.
With this distinction , we have no sympathyg and confess
we can see no good reason for it to rest upon. When a
te.ugraph company agrees to transmit arid deliver a message
promp.tly wherein dollars ans cents are alone involved, and
its negligence occasions loss it is conceded by all the
authorities that it may be compelled to respond in damages
Why? because it has been negligent, broken its agreement,
or, as sometimes said, failed to perform a d uty which it
oweb to the sender of the message or to the person to whom
addressed, as the case nay be."
The position of the courts in allowing this recov-
ey for mental suf fering, has many arguments in its favor,
though the fiction Nhic, they have resorted to does not
seem to be a- propriate to the ref(.-m.
The strongest argumerit advanced by the jAdges in
the cases that refuse to a.low this recovery, is, that
case upon case has held to the same effect, arid that they
wil1 riot depart from the precedent thus established. There
is reason and some logic in the argument that the inj.4ry
is so vague, so purely metaphysical and, herefore, so in-
definate arid apt to be so variable in different persons,
that the jury cannot estimate it with any degree of cer-
tainty, or have any standard to go by- This same argu-
ment would apply to awarding damages for any physical
injury. The jury cannot afvard damages in any case exactly
in proportion to the actual damage suffered. The most
they can do is to try and do the right thingas nearly as
possible. Would an argument that because the jury might
bi-a little wild in assessing damages for a physical inju-
ry be sustained for - moment to refuse a recovery* The
absurdity of the argument in connection with an injury to
the feelings is equally apparent, but in a less degree.
One judge in support of his position that damages for men-
tal suffering solely should not be awarded said:- " It
would open the doors to metaphysics, philosophy, and
physiology." ( Johnson v. We-iis Fargo & Co., 6 Nev. 224;
s. c. 3 Am. Rep., 245.) Of course the courts would have
to proceed differently have to admit a different kind of
testimony; but it would be always to secure justice. A
party claims t be injured; it is the duty of the court
to give him adequate relief, always having due regar, for
the rights of both parties. The fact that it wo,ild take a
court a little more time and be more difficult to ascer-
tain the precise rights of the parties is not a valid rea-
son for refusing to take cognizance at all. There is no
case that is adjudicated where perfect justice is done-
-he plaintiff will either recover more of a compensation
than he deserves or less- Even if the defendant may be
used a little harshly, is that any reason for letting the
plaintiff suffer withoutany compensation at all? All that
can be done is to try and do exact justice as nearly as
possible
Itis also said, if suah damages were to be allowed,
it would promote endless litigation Wge do not claim that
every little injiry to the feeling:s should be compensated
for ir, a court of lawa. The same rules would apply to this
class of actions as to every other. Take a specific case:
if a perso. b'-ings an action in a court of record in New
York for sl-,. der, libel, seduction and the like, arid
recovers less than fifLy dollars, he can only recover
costs equal to the amount of his verdict; and as the costs
in an action of this kind are about ore hundred doilars,
it would not be a pvfitable suit. The same provision for
actions to recover damages for mentai suffering could be a
made, that is, providing that they could only be brought
in a court of record, and if less than fifty dollars were
recovered the plaintiff would only be entitled to costs
equal to his verdict. So far as the endless litigation
argument id concerned, that would have no more weight as
applied to,thee cases than to any tort or contract action
A person is discouraged from bringing suit for uny petty
injury.
I need not state how essential to mans well being
and prosperity is the state of ones mind; that is all ad-
mitted, and the inconsistency of the courts in following
those old precedents , is shown, where they will allow
damages in one case arid refuse them in another, and at the
same time admit that the plaintiff has been injured in
both instances. he principal being that if there is some
other injury to rhe person or property, damages for mental
suffeving may be awardedq tmere fiction having no value
as I see. The courts in the telegraph cases , as I have
before shown, have made still another refinement or ad-
vancement , allowing damages for mental suffering when
nominal damages may be awarded.
Now in the violation of the right to privacy, the
person has been injured by another, because a legal right
has been violated, and is entitled to nominal damages at
least; and following out the late refinement, his mental
anguish may be compensated for. I would put it on the
Berkshire
broad ground, as Judge Xa&XIX in Reese v. Tel. Co. inti-
mated, that, where a legal right has been violated, the
person injured has a right to such damages as he has suf-
fered; but perhaps it is well to keep within the authori-
ties when the same result is accomplished.
CONCLUSI ON.
As the world advance- man becomes more sensitive.
He is able to appreciate and enjoy matters that to the
savage wuuld seem utter folly and nonsense. He feels a
greater independence in himself; feels that there are cer-
tain things that should be known to himself and his only.
He desires a place of retreat where he can feel secure
from outside observation. So as civilization advances
this right to privacy will become more and more important.
Its just protection and enforcement will depend on the at-
titude of the people toward it . If they do not agitae i;;
let its violation go on without any particular remon-
strance they cannot expect the law to justly protect it
For the law is in its nature passive. It is in fact but
a resultant of the civilization and learning of the people.
While a man is protected in all his business relations,
his property and person, will it be said that he can have
no protection from the gossip monger?

